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BRIGITTE ECOLIVET-HERZOG*

The New French Divorce Law
Introduction
On January 1, 1976, the new French divorce law came into effect. ' It replaced
a century-old law which had become part of the Civil Code after a long campaign by a member of the French Assembly, Mr. Naquet. 2 The general system
then adopted was one of divorce based upon fault. 3 Divorce was considered a
sanction invocable in the case of breach of the duties imposed by marriage so
that facts not imputable to the fault of one of the spouses, like insanity, were
not a ground for divorce.
The Naquet law established four grounds for divorce: adultery, conviction
of a crime, abusive or cruel conduct, and infliction of serious injury."
Adultery and criminal conviction were so-called preemptory grounds of
divorce, meaning the court had no discretionary power and was compelled to
grant divorce once the facts alleged had been proven. IThe fact that the judge had
no discretion made divorce readily obtainable on those grounds. If both
spouses agreed to the divorce, they could very easily create fictitious facts to
prove adultery. 6 As to cruel or abusive conduct, 7 it was difficult to distinguish
between them. Both referred to physical mistreatment, and even though the
text of the statute seemed to require repeated acts, judges normally were satisfied with a single act so long as it was of sufficient gravamen, such as an attempt

*Member of the New York Bar, formerly a member of the Paris (France) Bar.
'Law No. 75-617 of July 11, 1975, (1975) J.O. 7171, (1975) D.S.L. 248. For the effective date, see
Article 25 of the law.
'J. CARBONNIER, DROIT CIVIL, 402 (1962).
'See articles 229-311 of the FRENCH CIVIL CODE, as added in 1884. The FRENCH CIVIL CODE
as originally adopted by Napoleon had a number of articles on divorce and separation, but they were
abrogated during the Bourbon Restoration and divorce was thereafter reintroduced in 1884.
'For an excellent discussion of the law on divorce in France before 1975, see: M. RHEINSTEIN,
MARRIAGE, STABILITY, DIVORCE AND THE LAW, 194-221 (1972), hereinafter cited as RHEINSTEIN.
See also, I.M. Planiol, Traite'Elementairede DroitCivil, Nos. 1130-1362 (Louisiana Law Institute
Translation 1959) hereinafter cited as Planiol.
1C. Civ., January 29, 1936, (1937) D.P.I. 15; C. Civ., December 17, 1954, (1955) D. JUR. 255.
See also articles 229 and 230 of the FRENCH CIVIL CODE as added in 1884.
'RHEINSTEIN, supra note 4, at 220.
'Article 232 of the FRENCH CIVIL CODE as added in 1884.
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to murder the other spouse. In the case of demands for divorce based on such
grounds as well as in the case of serious injury, the courts had wide discretionary
power to grant divorce or not. The term "serious injury" was very liberally
construed so that it could be considered the rough equivalent of "mental cruelty" in New York law. 8
The attitude of the courts toward divorce was so liberal that

"...

divorce as a

sanction of the official law on the books had effectively been transformed into
divorce on account of marriage-breakdown of the law in action [sic]. "9 Under
those circumstances, the refusal of the legislature to change the law by recognizing divorce by mutual consent made little sense.' 0 The adoption of the new
law reflects not only a desire for liberalization, which has also been felt in other
branches of the law" in France as in other countries, 2 but also puts an end
to what has been referred to as "a judicial comedy based on [sic] lies."' 3
However, the reform does more than give a legislative sanction to what was
formerly the judicial practice."' The whole question of divorce has been rethought in the light of what seems desirable for today's lifestyle.
The reform focuses on the future of the family rather than on the past conduct of the spouses. "sThe legislature attempted to avoid a narrowly conceived
law, i.e., one based either exclusively upon fault or alternatively, marriage
breakdown. 16 Instead, the new law offers a broad spectrum of grounds,"I from
that of traditional "fault" to that of "mutual consent" or other liberalized
grounds which look upon divorce as a means of freeing one of the spouses from
a conjugal bond when the ends of marriage can no longer be attained. 8
It is interesting to note that the French President, Valery Giscard d'Estaing,

supra note 4, at 221. See also, I. J. CARBONNIER, DROIT CIVIL, 410-415 (1962).
Chesne, Le divorce par consentement mutuel, (1963) D. Chron. 95. Also, Report No. 1681, in the

'RHEINSTEIN,

name of the Committee on Legislation to the French National Assembly, by Mr. Donnez (2nd session 1974-1975) at 11, hereinafter cited as Report No. 1681.

1d.
"See fr example: Law No. 72-3 of January 3, 1972, (1972) J.O. 145, (1972) D.S.L. 51 on filiation, and Law No. 70-459 of June 4, 1970, (1970) J.O. 5227, (1970) D.S.L. 138, on the power of
parents.
"In the last five years, Sweden (1973), The Netherlands (1971) Italy (1970) and England (1969)
have adopted new divorce laws, see Report No. 1681, supra note 9, at 6-10. In the United States

of America, the question of divorce reform is also widely discussed. See for example, RHEINSTEIN,
supra note 4, at 444.
'"Le Monde, May 27-28, 1975, 1st column. See also Report No. 1681, supra note 9, at 11.
'Extensive studies, including comparative law studies, were made and polls were taken in connection with the new law on divorce. See, LE DIVORCE ET LES FRANCAIS, vols. 1 and 2 (1974-1975).
"Le Monde. May 30, 1975. p. 12 (Statement made by Mr. J. Lecanuet, Ministre de la Justice).
"See Podell, The Casefor Revision of the Uniform Marriageand Divorce Act, 7 FAM'.

L.Q. 169

(1973).
"Report No. 1681, supra note 9, at 12 and 13.
"Articles 230-46 of the CIVIL CODE as amended by Law No. 75-617 of July 11, 1975, supra note 1.
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took special interest in the drafting of the law, 9 following, in that respect, the
example of Napoleon who had taken a very active part in the drafting of the
original articles on divorce for the French Civil Code.20 One of his prime objec2
tives was that the law should be drafted to be comprehensible to laymen. The
new law, though controversial at its inception, seems now to have met with
general acceptance. 22
The law has been complemented by a decret (administrative regulation)
dealing with various matters of detail and procedure which under the current
French constitutional rules are not within the jurisdiction of Parliament. 23
I. Grounds for Divorce
A. Divorce Based on Fault
The new law retains fault as a basis for divorce.24 However, since other
grounds are now available, the complaint that fault-based divorce breeds
perjury is considerably mitigated. Retention of this ground will permit relief
in certain cases where a spouse adjudged "at fault" does not agree to the
divorce. "
The new articles 242 to 246 of the Civil Code require repeated serious violations of the duties of marriage, making the continuation of a state of matrimony
impossible. The wording of these new articles is quite similar to that of their
predecessors. Therefore it is to be expected that, in the main, the case law on
2
the question of what constitutes a "serious violation" will be followed. " There

"Paris-Match No. 1351, April 19, 1975, p. 44.
"0For a description of the part taken by Napoleon in the drafting of the divorce provisions, see a
recent article in French: D. Roughol-Valdeyron, ledivorce par consentement mutuelet le code Napoleon, (1975) REV. CmiM. D. Civ. 482. See also, B. SCHWARTZ, THE CODE NAPOLEON AND THE
COMMON LAw WORLD (1956).
I'This has been criticized by lawyers. See Mr. Jean Foyer, (1975) J.O. Deb. Nat. Ass. 3354, col. 2,
stating that it would render the interpretation of the law more difficult. However, generally, the
French President has been praised for having made the law clearer. See, Lindon, La nouvelle le'gislation sur le divorce et le recouvrement public des pensions alimentaires, (1975) J.C.P. I. 2728 No.
25, hereinafter cited as Lindon. For some examples of the changes made by the French President,
see Le Monde, April 10, 1975, p. 8.
"The provisions which have been the most controversial are those dealing with divorce for mental
illness and divorce for marriage irretrievably broken. See Le Monde, June 3, 1975, 16, 3rd to 6th
columns. See also Le Monde, May 30, 1975, 12 and 13.
"Decree of December 5, 1975, (1975) J.O. 12,522, (1975) D.S.L. 426.
"Articles 242-246 of the CIVIL CODEas amended by Law No. 75-617 of July 11, 1975, supra note
1.For criticism of the notion of fault as a basis for divorce see the position taken by the Socialist and
Communist groups before the National Assembly, Report No. 1681, supra note 9, at 15. See also,
(1975) J.O. Deb. Nat. Ass. 3648, col. 2 and 3649, col. 1.
"Carbonnier, la question du divorce, Memoire a consulter, (1975) D.S. CHRoN. 115. See also
Report No. 368 in the name of the Committee on Legislation to the French Senate, by Mr. Geoffroy
(2nd session 1974-1975) at 17, hereinafter cited as Report No. 368.
6RHEINSTEIN, supra note 4, at 218-221. See also Planiol, supra note 4, Nos. 1163-1170.
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are, however, two important innovations: a single act of adultery is no longer a
peremptory cause of divorce,27 and, second, violation of marital duties must
render the continuation of life in common impossible. 2 The former article on
the same subject referred to "the impossibility of continuing the conjugal
bond." One may wonder to what extent the difference in form amounts to a
difference in substance. Could one say that acts of adultery might not render the
life in common impossible even if they might render the continuation of the
conjugal bond impossible?29
The fact that the spouse introducing the action is himself at fault will no
longer bar his action. Consequently, divorce may now be granted for reciprocal
wrongs. 30
If a reconciliation between the spouses has taken place after the facts alleged,
it will not be possible to use them as a ground for divorce. 31 The courts have
broad discretion in passing upon the facts which may tend to establish reconciliation."2
B. Divorce by Mutual Consent
The most interesting and substantial change in the new law is the introduction of divorce by mutual consent. This appears to reflect the wishes of the
majority of the population," and is therefore likely to become the most frequently used ground. In addition, the legislature has clearly tried to encourage
its use. "
Mutual consent does not mean divorce at will as under the divortium bona
gratia of the Romans.35 The law creates a number of procedural and administrative devices to insure that the consent given by each spouse is a real and

"Lindon, supra note 21, Nos. 44-50. Article 243 of the CIVIL CODE as amended by Law No. 75617 of July 11, 1975, supra note 1, seems to eliminate the other peremptory cause of divorce, conviction of a serious crime. See Report No. 368, at 17.
2
Article 242 of the CIVIL CODE as amended by Law No. 75-617 of July 11, 1975, supra note 1.
29
Article 215 of the CIVIL CODE seems to include the possibility that the spouses will have separate
domiciles. As noted, the wording of article 242 as amended by Law No. 75-617 of July 11, 1975,
supra note 1, might create some problems.
3
Article 245 of the CIVIL CODE as amended by Law No. 75-617 of July 11, 1975, supra note 1.
"Article 244 of the CIVIL CODE as amended by Law No. 75-617 of July 11, 1975, supra note 1.
"Since the existence of the reconciliation is a question of fact, the lower court findings on that
question are not reviewable. On the scope of review of the lower courts in France, see P. HE1zoo,
CIVIL PROCEDURE IN FRANCE 306 (1967).
"According to a poll taken by the Ministry of Justice, 89 percent of the people polled were in favor
of divorce by mutual consent. See Report No. 368, supra note 25, at 3.
"To encourage the use of that ground, the law permits at any time a change from the ground of
divorce originally alleged to mutual consent. See article 246 of the CIVIL CODE as amended by Law
No. 75-617 of July 11, 1975, supra note 1.
3
Planiol, supra note 4, No. 1147.
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informed one.3 6 The petition for divorce by mutual consent can be brought
only to dissolve a marriage of more than six months. The couple must have a
personal interview with the judge who is to evaluate the genuineness of their
consent and, in addition, the presence of any undue pressure. After the interview, the spouses may renew their request within three months, or, at latest,
no later than six months after the expiration of the three-month waiting period.
Failure to act within that period will compel the spouses to start the procedure
anew. 37
Both spouses can agree to be represented by one lawyer who must present
38
to the judge a draft of an agreement setting forth the divorce settlement. If
the judge finds the agreement unconscionable, or, if he is not satisfied with it
for some other reason, he can refuse to grant the divorce. 39 For instance, if
the judge thinks that the interests of any children are insufficiently protected,
he can deny the petition. The role of the judge is thus very critical, in the case
of divorce by mutual consent. In addition to a purely judicial role, he is also
an advisor to the spouses, and, in certain circumstances, is their mediator.
In refusing to grant a divorce he can oblige the spouses to revise their agreement
according to his own standards of fairness and justice.4 0 This expanded judicial
role is emphasized by the fact that a specialized judge will be in charge of such
divorces. While the regular three-judge court of first instance remains competent in other cases of divorce, divorce by mutual consent will be within the
competence of a "judge for matrimonial affairs" (juge des affaires matrimoniales or "J.A.M.") who will sit alone. Theoretically at least, this will eliminate
delays and will permit such judges to acquire a certain expertise in dealing with
matrimonial questions.'

"6Articles 231 and 232 of the CIVIL CODE as amended by Law No. 75-617 of July 11, 1975, supra
note 1.
"Article 231, last paragraph, of the CIVIL CODE as amended by Law No. 75-617 of July 11, 1975,
supra note 1. The different time periods are the following: No divorce by mutual consent during
the first six months of the marriage. The petition must be renewed at the end of a three month
period following the personal interview with the judge. It must be filed within six months following
the three months period just noted. If the parties do not act within the six month period then they
have to start the whole proceedings anew. For a criticism of those different time periods, see Report
No. 368, supra note 25, at 18. It has been said that the six month period is either too short or alternatively
too long.
3
'Article 231, first paragraph of the CIVIL CODE as amended by Law No. 75-617 of July 11, 1975,
supra note 1. For a discussion of the importance and consequences of the possibility of utilizing only
one lawyer, see infra, Part IV, and notes 116 and 117.
"Article 232 of the CIVIL CODE as amended by Law No. 75-617 of July 11, 1975, supra note 1.
4For a discussion, see Lindon, supra note 21, Nos. 146 and 147.
"For a detailed discussion, see Grosle're, le Juge aux Affaires Matrimoniales ou l'HommeOrchestre du Divorce. (1976) D.S. CHRON. 73. See also, Lindon, supra note 21, Nos. 404 to 411. See
infta, Part IV and notes 113, 114 and 115.
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C. Divorce in Case of MarriageIrretrievably Broken
The irretrievable breakdown of a marriage as a ground for divorce has stirred

much controversy. It is a vast departure from the two most widely accepted
bases for divorce: fault of one of the spouses and mutual consent. 42 In the case
of "irretrievable breakdown," the divorce can be demanded by a spouse "at
fault" against the wishes of an innocent spouse. It is therefore a means of free-

ing one spouse from the matrimonial bond when he or she decides that the ends
of marriage can no longer be attained, even though there has been no "fault"
of any kind on the part of the spouse against whom the divorce is asked.43
The new procedure can be invoked in two quite different situations: i.e., if
the spouses have not been living together for more than six years;" or, in fact,
if one of the spouses has been confined to a mental institution for more than
six years. 4 In the case of a de facto separation of the requisite duration, it is
immaterial whose conduct brought it about. While "lumping" of both situations as "irretrievable breakdown" created much turmoil and opposition in
the National Assembly and press, 6 adoption of this "package" as legitimate
grounds for divorce was urged by the government. It was forcefully argued that
it was simply not realistic to ignore a de facto separation which had lasted for
more than six years. 7 As for mental illness, it was the opinion of the government that when the illness had lasted for more than six years with no hope of
48
recovery, an option should be given to the other spouse to end the marriage.
Thus, so called "divorce by repudiation" has been introduced into the French

Civil Code, albeit with some protection for the repudiated spouse. Divorce is
not to be granted automatically on the bare proof either that the spouses have

been living apart for more than six years, or on such proof that one of the

2

4 See in Le Monde, June 3, 1975, p. 16 the article by Ms. Francoise Champetier de Ribes, General
Secretary of the action group for women's associations (Secretaire GWitral du groupe d'action pour
les associations de femnes) entitled: "The End of the Marriage" in which she stated that the introduction of divorce-repudiation was going to destroy the meaning of marriage itself. She also argued
that the specific bases for divorce should not have retroactive effect and thus should not be applied
to couples married before July 1975.
4'Articles 237-41 of the CIVIL CODE as amended by Law No. 75-617 of July 11, 1975, supra note 1.
"Article 237 of the CIVIL CODE as amended by Law No. 75-617 of July 11, 1975, supra note 1.
"Article 238 of the CIVIL CODE as amended by Law No. 75-617 of July 11, 1975, supra note 1.
4'See in Le Monde, May 31, 1975, p. 13, 3rd to 6th columns. See also Report No. 368, at 13, 14,
15 and 16 and Report No. 1681 at 32, 33 and 34. According to statements made by the government
and reported in the newspapers, de facto separation and mental illness are causes of divorce in
Belgium, England, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Scandinavia, Switzerland, U.S.A. and U.S.S.R.
Furthermore, it was also reported that 65 percent of the people in France thought that it was a good
idea to permit divorce in case of mental illness. Report No. 368, at 4.
"Le Monde, May 30, 1975, p. 12 (statement by Mr. Jean Lecanuet before the National Assembly,
on May 28, 1975).
'See supra notes 46 and 47.
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spouses has been incurably mentally ill for an equivalent time.49 The plaintiff
spouse must be ready to support the other spouse and must demonstrate ability
to meet these expenses. 50 It must be admitted however that the guarantees
instituted to secure performance of this obligation are quite limited.51
If the defendant spouse can successfully prove that the granting of the divorce
would create an undue hardship because of age, health, children or duration of
the marriage, the judge may refuse to grant the divorce. It should be noted that
the hardship can be either economic or psychological.52 Even though such a
hardship clause is well known in divorce laws in other countries, this is the first
time it has been introduced in France. 3 As it is not yet clear just what any particular judge will consider as undue hardship, a certain amount of "forum shopping" may come into existence. For instance, a judge who is himself divorced
may be more lenient when evaluating undue hardship than one whose religious
convictions dictate a more anti-divorce attitude. In the light of the limited
review powers of the French Cour de Cassation (Supreme Court), it is uncertain
to what extent that court will be able to lay down unifying national guidelines. "
It is noteworthy that the French Minister of Justice has deemed the "divorce
by repudiation" provisions of the new law its most important ones. 55 In the
author's opinion, however, they may also, on occasion, have the most unconscionable results. 56

'lhrough Article 238, last paragraph and Article 240 of the CIVIL CODE as amended by Law
No. 75-617 of July 11, 1975, supra note 1, the judge here again will be called to play an active part.
See infra note 54.
0
" Article 239 of the CIVIL CODE as amended by Law No. 75-617 of July 11, 1975, supra note 1.
"Interestingly enough, since the duty of support remains, the judge cannot link the granting of
the divorce to the payment of the "alimony," as in the case of the compensatory payment. See Lindon, supra note 21, No. 101. See also article 275 of the CIVIL CODE as amended by Law No. 75-617 of
July 11, 1975, supra note 1.
"Article 240 of the CIVIL CODE as amended by Law No. 75-617 of July 11, 1975, supra note 1,
expressly uses the words "economic or psychological." It is immaterial whether the consequences
affect the spouse or the children. Furthermore, in case of mental illness, the judge can refuse to grant
the divorce if he thinks it might have harmful effects on the mentally ill spouse.
"See, for example§ 4 of the English Divorce Reform Act of 1969 and also, Riesen, Divorce Reform
in Germany, 7 FAM. L.Q. 351 (1973) at 366-368.
"The Courde Cassation (French Supreme Court) accepts as correct all points of fact found by the
judgment under review. It inquires only whether given those facts the law has been properly applied to

them. See P.

HERZOG, CIVIL PROCEDURE IN FRANCE,

428-432 (1967) for a discussion of the role of the

Cour de Cassation.
""Divorce by repudiation" is obviously a response to the currently held philosophy of individual
liberty wherein a person should not be forced to remain bound to a marriage which he or she no longer
accepts. See Benabent, la liberte individuelle et le mariage, (1973) REv. TmIM. D. Civ. 440.
"See Lindon, supra note 21, Nos. 93-98 for an account of the positions and attitudes of the
National Assembly and Senate. See also Le Monde, June 1-2, 1975, p. S, and Report No. 368, supra
note 25, at 13.
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D. Divorce-Resignation
Articles 233 through 236 provide for a kind of divorce called "divorce-resignation." ' s In such a situation, no fault is alleged by the spouse asking for divorce.
The plaintiff simply refers to a de facto situation which, regardless of fault,
renders life in common unbearable. 8 If, and only if, the other spouse acknowledges the situation described by the other party, the judge pronounces the
divorce without having to allocate blame.5 9 It is difficult to foresee broad use
of this kind of divorce except in a situation where the parties agree on the
divorce but not on the consequences. 60 At any time during the procedure, the
parties may switch to a divorce by mutual consent and present their own agree61
ment for approval by the judge.
Conclusion
The wide range of grounds for divorce now available in France represents a
pragmatic approach to the problem. There was a concerted effort to respond
to the infinite variety of fact situations likely to arise between divorce-seeking
parties by incorporating more modern approaches into existing law rather than
by entirely repudiating prior law with adoption of a single standard "no
fault" divorce system. 62 Perhaps even more important for a "successful" divorce
law is a property settlement which has a tolerable impact upon the parties after
the divorce. Here, too, the legislature has been innovative.
I. Consequences of the Divorce
The question of alimony or support payments is usually the most difficult
to solve, but an appropriate solution may be the key to a "successful" divorce.63
Interestingly enough, the notion of divorce has always been negatively linked to
alimony rarely paid coupled with the absence of any real relief to the creditor
spouse.6 As a necessary concommitant of the new divorce law, there is now a

"See Report No. 1681, supra note 9, at 31: "The basis for divorce detailed in articles 233 to 246 is
a dual system, something between the divorce by mutual consent and the divorce for fault. Its purpose is practical with the intent to undramatize the divorce."
"The judge, however, is obliged to pronounce the divorce as one of reciprocal fault since he
cannot look at the question of who actually is at fault.
"Article 234 of the CIVIL CODE as amended by Law No. 75-617 of July 11, 1975, supra note 1. See
also Lindon, supra note 21, No. 132.
"See note 57, supra.
"Article 246 of the CIVIL CODE as amended by Law No. 75-617 of July 11, 1975, supra note 1,
which applies also to divorce for fault as well as divorce-repudiation.
"See the statements made by Mr. Jean Lecanuet before the National Assembly and reported in
Le Monde, May 30, 1975, 12: "We gave preference to a law which would be as responsive as possible
to the fact situations likely to occur."
"Carbonnier, laquestion du divorce. Melmoire a consulter, (1975) D.S. CH-oN. 115.
"On January 2, 1973, (1973) J.O. 135, (1973) D.S.L. 63, a law permitting a person entitled to
alimony to claim payment from any debtor of the person liable for alimony, was adopted. According
to polls, that law has given some encouraging results. See (1975) J.O. Deb. Nat. Ass. 3637.
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guarantee for the payment of alimony."
Under prior law, support was mainly governed by article 301 of the Civil
Code. 66 Enforcement was quite complex because of the ambivalent nature of
the applicable rules. Alimony was the equivalent of damages, a compensation
for the wrongful act of one of the spouses. Only the innocent spouse was entitled
to payments which continued even if the debtor-spouse happened to die first.
However, since the principal purpose of alimony was support, Article 301 made
it clear that alimony payments could be granted only to supply the actual needs
of the innocent spouse. For that reason, alimony could be terminated or
reduced if it became apparent that it was no longer needed or not needed in
the full amount.67 Because of the prior ban on divorce by mutual consent, no
settlement between spouses was possible relating to the payment of alimony.6 8
Finally, alimony was limited in amount. Article 301 specified explicitly that
the amount of alimony could never exceed one-third of the revenue of the spouse
paying it. It is interesting to note that when divorce was pronounced against
both spouses for their reciprocal wrongs, there could be no alimony; obviously the
consequence of a theory that protected only the innocent spouse. 69
In the new law, the legislature has tried to depart from the complexity of
the former legislation by distinguishing clearly the cases in which a so-called
"compensatory payment" can be obtained from the cases in which a duty
of support remains on one spouse. 70 The duty of support remains in effect
during the divorce proceeding.7" Once the divorce has been granted, article 270

"SLaw No. 75-618 of July 11, 1975, (1975) J.O. 7178, (1975) D.S.L. 254. According to that law, a
person entitled to a "support payment" or to a "compensatory payment" on the basis of a court
decision and who has been unable to obtain payment even after using the procedure mentioned in
note 64 supra, can have the agents of the Ministry of Finance collect it for his or her benefit. The
request is addressed to the agent of the Treasury through the Procureurde la Republique. The
procedures are those generally applied by the agents of the Treasury for the collection of taxes.
Lindon, supra note 21, Nos. 232-260 for a detailed commentary on the new law.
Since these officials have substantial enforcement powers, this made it unnecessary to establish
a security fund which would have compensated the unpaid spouse directly and later tried to recover
from the spouse liable for support. According to Ms. F. Giroud, State Secretary for Women's Matters, such a fund would have been quite expensive to operate and would have created moral as well
as social problems. See (1975) J.O. Deb. Nat. Ass. 4088. See also, Lindon, supra note 21, Nos.
232-233.
66
1n general, Planiol supra note 4, Nos. 1258-1261. See also. Esmein, le double visage et les
singularites de la pension apres divorce, (1953) D. CHRON. 67.
61Article 301, last paragraph of the CIVIL CODE, as added in 1884.
"See, Delaume, France:Recent Developments in the Law of Alimony Settlements Incidental to

Divorce. 5 AM. J. CoMP. L. 227 (1956).
"Planiol, supra note 4, No. 1258.
7
Article 270 of the CIVIL CODE as amended by Law No. 75-617 of July 11, 1975, supra note 1. See
also, Report No. 1681, at 59-61. The duty of support remains as a protection for the spouse on
whom the divorce is imposed.
"Article 255 of the CIVIL CODE as amended by Law No. 75-617 of July 11, 1975, supra note 1.
InternationalLawyer, Vol. 11, No. 3
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makes the following provisions: "[E]xcept when [sic] divorce is pronounced for
marriage irretrievably broken, it puts an end to the duty of support as provided in
article 212 of the Civil Code. However, one of the spouses can be obliged to pay
to the other a certain sum of money which will compensate as far as possible
for the disparities that the divorce will create in the conditions of life of the
respective spouses." 7 This text departs in a number of ways from the old law.
First, the duty of support remains in certain specific instances; second, the fault
of one spouse is not taken into consideration when determining the compensatory payment; third, no arbitrary limit is put on the amount to be paid."
Article 212 lists a number of factors which the judge should weigh in order
to arrive at the compensatory sum: age and health of the spouses; age of the
children, if any; professional qualifications; possibility of gainful employment;
wealth in the form of capital as well as earned income. 74 Due to the compensatory character of payment, once a sum is fixed by the judge, there is no continuing
jurisdiction except in extraordinary circumstances."5 In order to avoid injustice
or inequities, the judge has wide discretion at the time he determines the
amount of compensation and can adjust the amount to the situation, needs,
and means of the spouses. Furthermore, article 276-1 permits the indexation
of the payment when made in the form of periodic payments, 76 although the
legislature has indicated a clear preference for lump sum payment of the "compensatory sum." 77 While the payment of one lump sum will avoid the economic

as well as psychological difficulties inherent in monthly payments; realistically,
however, in many cases it will be quite difficult, if not impossible, for one spouse
to come up with a single large compensatory award. Such spouses will have to use
monthly installments .

7

The legislature has also tried to encourage the non-judicial settlement of
differences. The parties are encouraged to present their agreement on financial
matters to the judge who must assure himself of its fairness. Within such limits,
the parties can agree on the amount to be paid and the form of payment." The
spouses may modify their agreement subsequently, subject to judicial ratifica"Note 70, supra.
"Article 271 of the CIVIL CODE as amended by Law No. 75-617 of July 11, 1975, supra note 1.
"Lindon, supra note 21, No. 179.
"The list is quite similar to the one given in the N.Y. Domestic Relations Law § 236 which
requires the judge to take into consideration "the length of time of the marriage, the ability of the
wife to be self-supporting, the circumstances of the case and of the respective parties."
"Article 273 of the CIVIL CODE as amended by Law No. 75-617 of July 11, 1975, supra note 1.
"Article 274 of the CIVIL CODE as amended by Law No. 75-617 of July 11, 1975, supra note 1. See
also Report No. 1681, supra note 9, at 72-73. The payment of the compensatory sum in one or at the
most three payments should make it possible to put a real end to the relations between the divorced
spouses.
"Indexation which is normally against public policy (see Ordonnance of December 30, 1958,
article 79 as quoted under article 1243 of the CIVIL CODE, ed. Dalloz.) is permitted by law in a
specific number of instances.
"Accord, Lindon, supra note 21, Nos. 172-196.

InternationalLawyer, Vol. 11, No. 3

The New French DivorceLaw
tion. In addition, a spouse may insist upon a clause under which he or she may
ask the judge for a unilateral modification of the agreement should his or her
economic situation warrant.80 The indispensability of such a clause should be
noted, since when the financial aspects of the divorce are judicially determined
there is no possibility of reopening except under extraordinary circumstances.8 1
The sum to be paid is to compensate for any disparities created by the
divorce. Fault is not considered except when the divorce has been granted for
the exclusive fault of one of the spouses, as in the case of articles 242 to 246.12
However, even in such a case, there is a substantial departure from prior law.
Even though the divorce is granted on the basis of the exclusive fault of one
spouse, this spouse is not precluded from receiving a compensatory payment
when, on the basis of existing circumstances, it would be contrary to justice
and equity to refuse such payment. This rule, a novelty under French law, illustrates the switch from the concept of fault to a concept of equity."8
In case of divorce for marriage irretrievably broken, alimony support continues to be paid every month.84 Continuing judicial supervision is provided
even though the payment might have been made in a lump sum. If the principal sum becomes inadequate, a complement in the form of periodic payments can always be asked for, since the spouse asking for divorce remains
liable for support. 8 However, "alimony" ceases if the creditor-spouse remarries
or lives with another person as husband and wife. 86 The heirs of the debitorspouse remain liable for the payment of alimony should the debtor-spouse die
first. 8 '
Finally, as before, a separate payment may be due for the support of children,
payable to the parent or person in charge of such children.88 The payment can
be made monthly or in the form of a principal payment.9 The divorce also puts
an end to the community of property of the spouses if they are married under
a community property regime. Assets are divided between them according to
their specific matrimonial regime. 90

'"Article 278 of the CIVIL CODE as amended by Law No. 75-617 of July 11, 1975, supra note 1.
"Article 279 of the CIVIL CODE as amended by Law No. 75-617 of July 11, 1975, supra note 1.
"Compare articles 273 and 279 of the CIVIL CODE as amended by Law No. 75-617 of July 11,
1975, supra note 1.
"Article 280-1 of the CIVIL CODE as amended by Law No. 75-617 of July 11, 1975, supra note 1.
"Supra note 83, Article 280-1, last paragraph.
"Articles 281-85 of the CIVIL CODE as amendedby Law No. 75-617 of July 11, 1975, supra note 1.
Those articles present a departure from the former law since according to article 301 of the CIVIL
CODE as added in 1884, the duty of support was extinguished by the divorce.
"Article 283 of the CIVIL CODE as amended by Law No. 75-617 of July 11, 1975, supra note 1.
"Article 284 of the CIVIL CODE as amended by Law No. 75-617 of July 11, 1975, supra note 1.
"Articles 286-94 of the CVIL CODE as amendedby Law No. 75-617 of July 11, 1975, supra note 1.
"Article 294 of the CIVIL CODE as amended by Law No. 75-617 of July 11, 1975, supra note 1.
"For a discussion of matrimonial property questions in France before 1975, see Glendon, Matrimonial Property: A Comparative Study of Law and Social Change, 49 TULANE L. REV. 21 (1974),
specially at 67.
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UI. Judicial Separation
The new law, in keeping with tradition, also provides for judicial separation
of bed and board. 9" Conditions for separation are the same as those for divorce. 92 Separation is available on the basis of mutual consent or for marriage
irretrievably broken. The rules of procedure and evidence are also the same as
in divorce cases. 93 Some previously doubtful points have been clarified by the
new law. Article 297 provides that when one spouse counterclaims for judicial
separation in an action for divorce brought by the other, then the court may
grant a divorce for reciprocal wrongs. However, if one spouse asks for divorce
on the basis of marriage irretrievably broken, the otherspouse cannot counterclaim for separation since granting a separation in such a case would change
the six-year period into a nine-year one before the marriage could be termi94
nated.
The principal effect of separation is to relax the bonds of marriage. The marriage itself is not dissolved and all obligations of marriage remain except those
which are linked to the obligations of conjugal life. 95 This implies that if spouses
are married under a community property regime, separation of assets held in
community will not take place. 96 The duty of support based on need remains in
existence without regard to the fault of either spouse. 9' The spouses can inherit
from each other unless the basis for the judicial separation is the exclusive fault
of one of the spouses, in which case that spouse loses all rights to inherit. 9
The spouses can always put an end to the separation by again cohabiting.
In order to give legal effect to reconciliation, the parties must evidence their
intent either in a notarized deed or a notation on the records of the registrar
of vital statistics (officier de l'etat civil). 99 After three years of separation
either of the spouses can ask for a conversion of the separation into divorce."' 0
At any time, without waiting for the lapse of three years, the spouses can ask
jointly for a conversion.101 When the separation was obtained by mutual request, the conversion of the separation to divorce must also be made by mutual
request, even though the three-year period has elapsed. 10 2 A spouse may be

"For an expose of the former state of the law see Planiol, supra note 4, Nos. 1296 through 1362.
"Article 296 of the CIVIL CODE as amended by Law No. 75-617 of July 11, 1975, supra note 1.
"Article 298 of the CIVIL CODE as amended by Law No. 75-617 of July 11, 1975, supra note 1.
"Article 241, 2nd paragraph of the CIVIL CODE as amended by Law No. 75-617 of July 11, 1975,
supra note 1.
"Article 299 of the CIVIL CODE as amended by Law No. 75-617 of July 11, 1975, supra note 1.
"Article 302 of the CIVIL CODE as amended by Law No. 75-617 of July 11, 1975, supra note 1.
"Article 303 of the CIVIL CODE as amended by Law No. 75-617 of July 11, 1975, supra note 1.
"Article 301 of the CIVIL CODE as amended by Law No. 75-617 of July 11, 1975, supra note 1.
"Article 305 of the CIVIL CODE as amended by Law No. 75-617 of July 11, 1975, supra note 1.
"'Article 306 of the CIVIL CODE as amended by Law No. 75-617 of July 11, 1975, supra note 1.
"'Article 307 of the CIVIL CODE as amended by Law No. 75-617 of July 11, 1975, supra note 1.
"'Article 307, 2nd of the CIVIL CODE as amended by Law No. 75-617 of July 11, 1975, supra
note 1. See also Lindon, supra note 21, No. 375.
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willing to agree to a separation but not to a divorce. To permit the separation
by mutual request to be converted (automatically) into a divorce at the request
of one spouse would deprive the other spouse of the protective provisions or
benefits applicable to other grounds of divorce.
IV. Procedure and Rules of Evidence
It was the considered opinion of the drafters of the new code that the applicable
rules of procedure and evidence are so closely connected with the substantive law
of divorce that the legislature should incorporate them within the divorce law
rather than the Civil Procedure Code. 103 The most dramatic change in the rules of
evidence is that admissions by one spouse are now permitted,104 a change basically related to the introduction of divorce by mutual consent. Up to now, such
admissions could not be introduced since this would have permitted divorce by
mutual consent which was considered contrary to public policy.' 0 ' Certain other
kinds of evidence are still excluded. Lettersbetween one of the spouses and a third
party are not admissible if they have been obtained fraudulently by the spouse
introducing them.10 6 The absence of change here is seen as a confirmation of
present case-law' 017 and is in line with the law on the protection of the right of
privacy.' 0 1
Finally, it is interesting to note that in an attempt to encourage spouses to
deal frankly with each other during divorce proceedings, 109 and especially
during attempts at conciliation," 0 the law directs that all admissions and
declarations made at that time by one spouse cannot be used as evidence in
another proceeding.
Privilege cannot be asserted by persons having possession of documents which
might be useful to the judge in order to evaluate the wealth or needs of the
spouses. II'
Procedurally, the most interesting change is the creation of a judge specialized in matrimonial questions. As noted, that judge has exclusive competency
to deal with divorce by mutual consent. " 2 Once a divorce has been pronounced
"°3See Rheinstein, The Code and the Family, in the CODE NAPOLEON AND THE COMMON LAW
WORLD 139 (Schwartz, ed. 1956). See also, P. HERZOG, CIVIL PROCEDURE IN FRANCE 503 (1967)
pointing out the historical accident that the drafters of the Civil Code did not want to wait until the
completion of the Code of Civil Procedure to put the law on divorce into effect.
" Article 259 of the CIVIL CODE as amended by Law No. 75-617 of July 11, 1975, supra note 1.
°oThe prohibition of admissions only meant that they needed to be corroborated. See J. Flour,
Introduction l'Etude du Droit Civil, 799 (Cours Polycopie 1964-1965).
"'Article 259-1 of the CIVIL CODE as amended by Law No. 75-617 of July 11, 1975, supra note 1.
" Lindon, supra note 21, No. 348. The-same principle applies to the report, the so-called "constat
d'huissier"filed by huissiers. See article 259-2 of the CIVIL CODE as amended by Law No. 75-617 of
July 11, 1975, supra note 1.
"'Article 9 2 of the CIVIL CODE as amended by Law No. 70-643 of July 11, 1970.
1"'Article 236 of the CIVIL CODE as amended by Law No. 75-617 of July 11, 1975, supra note 1.
"'°Article 252-3 of the CIVIL CODEas amended by Law No. 75-617 of July 11, 1975, supra note 1.
II'Article 259-3 of the CIVIL CODE as amended by Law No. 75-617 of July 11, 1975, supra note 1.
"'See note 41 supra and the references there given.

a
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on any other ground by the three-judge court, he is in charge of all questions
dealing with alimony and child-custody as well as modification of the compensatory payment. 3 Procedure before the single judge (J.A.M.) has been much
simplified. Article 247 indicates that when the specialized judge is asked to
modify alimony, a compensatory payment, or child custody, he can decide the
4
case without formalities in informal proceedings."
Since, in the case of divorce by mutual consent, the spouses can agree on
one lawyer who will represent them, this reform has been denounced by certain
lawyers in France. "' Maitre Yves Tournois was quoted as saying, at a meeting
of the National Association of Young Lawyers: "We have the feeling that the
reform of the law on divorce is aimed at getting rid of lawyers." ' " 6 Monetary
considerations of course play a role in these criticisms which may be somewhat
misguided. Realistically it may be extremely difficult for one lawyer to represent both parties. Spouses, even though they agree on the divorce, may often
have conflicting property and financial interests. On the other hand, since the
role to be played by the judge in divorce by mutual consent has been
substantially increased, the dangers inherent in the representation of both
parties by one lawyer are perhaps not all that serious. Practice under this new
system will be carefully scrutinized by legislators and bar.
The question which remains to be asked is whether the French judicial system
will have the resources to perform the functions which have been given to it by
the new law. The role to be played by the specialized judge as well as the one
to be played by the court itself has been greatly enhanced at all stages of the
procedure: the pre-trial hearing," 7 the trial itself," 8 and post-decree questions. I" It is to be feared that unless the number of judges in charge of divorce
matters, as well as the number of administrative personnel, is drastically increased, the procedure will be very lengthy. The problems of delays which are
encountered now will not be solved but, on the contrary, increased so that the
20
benefits of the reform will be lost.
V. Conflict of Laws
The present law does not include any rules on the recognition of judgments
"'3Article 247 of the

CIVIL CODE as amended by Law No. 75-617 of July 11, 1975, supra note 1.
"4Article 247 last paragraph of the CIVIL CODE as amended by Law No. 75-617 of July 11, 1975,
supra note 1.
'Article 230 2 of the CIVIL CODE as amended by Law No. 75-617 of July 11, 1975, supra note 1.
However, Lindon, supra note 21, No. 422 argues that lawyers should have an increased role in
divorce matters because of the large choice given to the spouses.
"'Le Monde, May 11-12, 1975, 8, 4th column.
"Articles 251-3 of the CiviL CODE as amended by Law No. 75-617 of July 11, 1975, supra note 1.
"'Articles 245, 251, 275, 276 of the CIVIL CODE as amended by Law No. 75-617 of July 11, 1975,
supra note 1.
"'Articles 273, 279, 282, 285 of the CIVIL CODE as amended by Law No. 75-617 of July 11, 1975,
supra note 1.
' 20Lindon, supra note 21, No. 421.
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since according to article 34 of the 1958 Constitution that subject matter must
be dealt with by administrative regulation (dicret)and not by legislation. 2' The
new divorce law, however, in its article 310 tries to codify the question of the
law applicable to divorce and separation or, more precisely, to dictate when
divorce and separation are governed by French law.' 22 Codification of private
international law, subject by subject, is a relatively new phenomenon in
France. "3 It is a departure from former views which favored a general codification of the principles of conflicts of laws.
Because of the fragmentary and insufficient character of the provisions
regulating private international law in the Civil Code, the problem of the
codification of that subject has preoccupied French lawyers for many years. 124
In 1954, a draft was prepared on the subject by the Commission for the Reform
of the Civil Code, a body organized by the Ministry of Justice. Subsequently
a new draft was prepared by Professor Henri Batiffol of the faculty of law of
Paris and was adopted by the Commission in 1959. "5The provisions on separation and divorce read as follows in the second draft: "If the spouses have the
same national law, divorce and separation shall be governed by that law, otherwise the law of the country in which they have their domicile shall govern or
when they have no common domicile, the law of the country in which the case
is pending."'
The principle of such a codification of conflict of laws rules encountered
much opposition on the ground that it would freeze the law in a rapidly evolving
field,' 7 and was not adopted. Actually, as far as divorce and separation were
concerned, the draft was merely a codification of the case law on the subject,
particularly of two very well-known cases: Riviere and Bisbal.12
It has been thought in France that a codification of private international law
had to be effectuated as a whole, since it involved general principles and overall
trends. The consensus on that issue was broken by Jean Foyer, a member of the
National Assembly and a former professor of law. Acting on his own, he introduced an amendment containing the text of present article 310 which was
II'For a detailed article on the subject, see Tun, The Fifth Republic, the Legislative Power, and
ConstitutionalReview, 9 Am. J. CoM'. L. 335 (19......
i"For a strong criticism of article 310, see Francescakis, le suprenant article 310 du Code Civil
sur le divorce international,in 64 REV. CRIT. D.I.P. 443 (1975).
"'See however, articles 311-14 of the CIVIL CODE dealing with filiation, and article 60 of the law
of July 24, 1966 on corporations.
4
11 Loussouarn, French Draft on PrivateInternationalLaw, 30 TUL. L.
REV. 523 (1956).
"'Nadelman and A. Van Mehren, A FrenchDraft of a Law on PrivateInternationalLaw, 18 AM.
J. CoMP. L. 614 (1970) and the translation of the article of the draft. See also in French on the same
subject, Foyer, Nouveau projet de rforne du droit internationalprive 98 CLUNET 31 (1971).
"'Article 2295 of the French draft as translated by Nadelman and A. Van Mehren, 18 AM. J.
CoMP. L. 614 (1970).
'"Loussouarn, supra note 124, specially at 538 reporting that an important minority mainly of
practitioners were opposed to the codification.
"'22 H. BATIFFOL AND P. LAGARDE, Dnorr INTERNATIONAL PRIvE, (6bme ed. 1976) 69-78.
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adopted without much discussion by the National Assembly and the Senate. 29
Article 310 of the new law indicates that divorce and separation are governed
by French legislation in three different situations:
1. when both spouses are French nationals,
2. when both spouses are domiciled in France, and
3. when no foreign law declares itself competent and French courts are competent to decide the divorce or the separation.
The new article is supposed to codify the present French case law on the subject, but a superficial comparison of the text of the draft and of the text of
article 310 indicates some obvious discrepancies. The first paragraph is an
application of article 3 of the Civil Code according to which personal status is
governed by the national law of the parties. 130 That principle remains applicable to the extent article 310 does not provide differently. However, by using
"and" instead of "or," the text leaves the French spouse married to a foreigner
and living abroad without the possibility of having French law applied to his or
her divorce. That is a clear departure from the former case law on the subject. 3'
Another interesting change is that even though spouses have the same foreign
citizenship, they can obtain a divorce in France by application of French law
if they have a common domicile there. Under prior case law, such a result was
impossible because of the construction given to article 3, paragraph 3.13 Now,
according to article 310, paragraph 2, two Spanish citizens working and living
in France will be able to obtain a divorce before the French courts. In support
of that new rule it has been stated that it is more realistic to apply the law of
the common domicile and that it will make the work of the judge easier when
the national law of the parties is difficult to know.' 33 The change is not as significant as it appears since a French judge may, but is not obliged to, apply
foreign law.' 34
The third paragraph assumes a situation in which a French court would
normally apply foreign law to determine whether or not to grant a divorce because of the general principle enunciated in article 3(e) that questions of personal status are governed by the national law of the parties but the conflict of
law rules of that country (which French courts traditionally take into consideration under the renvoi doctrine) provide for the application of French law or in
any event do not provide for the application of any foreign law. 3 ' In such a case,

'(1975) J.0. Deb. Nat. Ass. July 1, 1975, p. 5064.

1301
H.

BATTIFFOL AND

P.

LAGARDE, DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVE,

(6eme ed. 1974) 348-355.

' 3'Lagarde, Destinees de 'arret Riviere. 99 CLUNET 241 (1971).
"I H. BATIFFOL AND P. LAGARDE, supra note 128, specially at 351.
"'ReportNo. 369, supra note 25, at 43.
"'Bisbal, May 12, 1959, (1960) REV. CRIT. D.I.P. 62, with a note by Prof. H. Batiffol.
'On the Renvoi doctrine in general see, A. EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICT OF LAWS 334 (1962).
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it is unnecessary to delve more deeply into renvoi problems. Instead French law
must automatically be applied, assuming, of course, that French courts are
competent.
The above rule creates at least two thorny problems. First, the French court
will have to determine that no foreign law is applicable, a task that may be quite
difficult since the rules of private international law are often obscure and not
easily ascertainable. Second, the courts might be faced with the problem of
36
The comwhat to do when two foreign laws declare themselves competent.
but
court,
the
for
only
not
problems
create
310
will
article
plexity of the new
For
without.
and
also for private parties and their counsels, both within France
example, under the French rules for the recognition of foreign judgments, as
enunciated in the famous Munzer decision' 37 a foreign judgment is entitled to
recognition in France only if the foreign court has applied the same law that is
applicable under French choice of law rules. Since the new French choice of law
rules are not at all clear, the instances in which recognition of foreign divorce
38
judgments can be obtained in France are also unfortunately quite uncertain.
Conclusion
It has often been said that a law is only what people do with it. That will
certainly be true of the new French law on divorce. In any event, the married
couples in France for whom the law was made will quickly learn that the best
way to enjoy it is still not to have to use it.

3

' See Francescakis, supra note 122, specially at 570-576.
'Munzer, Cass. Civ. Jan. 7, 1964, 91 CLUNET 302 (1964) with a note by Prof. B.Goldman.
' Batiffol, Recognition in Franceof ForeignDecrees DivorcingSpouses of Different Nationality.
4 AM. J. COMP. L. 574 (1955); see also P. HERZOG, CVIIL PROCEDURE IN FNaNCE, 585-608 (1967).
38
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